‘A fair idea of what hell must be like’: The Battle of Borodino, 1812 by Jamie Bryson

Seventy-five miles west of Moscow, along the road to Smolensk, was the village of Borodino, set in a landscape of green fields, woodland and rolling hills. In September 1812, this was the stage for the bloodiest single day of the Napoleonic Wars, which saw huge French and Russian armies, commanded by Napoleon Bonaparte and Mikhail Kutuzov, clash over a two-mile front to decide the fate of Moscow and the course of European history. In July 1812, Napoleon crossed the official border of the Russian Empire, marked by the Niemann River, in what is now modern Belarus and Lithuania. Leo Tolstoy labelled the invasion an event ‘contrary to human reason’, but there was a real basis that brought the two empires into conflict even if, in hindsight, it seemed weak compared to the destruction and drama the invasion wrought. Napoleon and Tsar Alexander of Russia’s dispute was rooted in competing ambitions and diplomatic disagreements, especially over Russia’s refusal to participate in the Continental System, a pan-European blockade aimed at bringing Britain to its knees. Once inside Russian borders, Napoleon was unable to force the Tsarist army into a decisive engagement. The French advance caused the Russians to retreat from the city of Smolensk, but as Napoleon approached Moscow, the Russian armies were obliged to give battle to avoid giving up their holy city without a fight. The French advanced on Moscow instead of St Petersburg because that was where the Russian army was, and defeating it was the quickest route to victory. On the road to Moscow, Kutuzov’s 72,000 infantry, 17,000 cavalry and 640 cannons represented a formidable obstacle, not to mention the fact that the Russians constructed large redoubts to protect their positions, the largest of which was known as the ‘Great Redoubt’. Behind the lines, Kutuzov arranged peasants and militia to help repair the earthworks. Russian troops were highly motivated to defend Moscow and further emboldened by the parade of the Virgin of Smolensk around their lines; they were also well-suited to an attritional slog, which the battle was likely to be. Napoleon possessed a numerical advantage, with some 90,000 experienced infantry who had fought across Europe, 30,000 cavalry and better-trained artillery consisting of over 500 cannons. His huge force was multi-national, comprising many Poles and Germans as well as Frenchmen. Napoleon’s strategy, seemingly flawed in hindsight, was to launch simple frontal assaults on the Russian earthworks, which was guaranteed to be costly. However, Napoleon believed any attempt to outflank the enemy, as his Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout suggested, would precipitate a Russian retreat, frustrating the chance for a decisive outcome – right up until the morning of the battle, Napoleon anxiously contemplated this eventuality. The fear of causing a Russian withdrawal and the need to secure his European empire by obtaining a swift victory in Russia, forced the French Emperor to attack the prepared entrenchments directly.

The battle began in the early hours of 7 September 1812 and lasted for a torturous fifteen hours. The number of cannons caused most of the field to be obscured by thick smog as huge numbers of French troops were thrown against the Russian positions, making for an apocalyptic atmosphere. The redoubts changed hands repeatedly while the French captured the village of Borodino itself. Several times, as the Russians appeared to be weakening, Napoleon’s Marshals requested he commit the 20,000 strong Imperial Guard, but the French Emperor refused, not wishing to risk its destruction. His Marshals cursed his caution, believing the fresh troops could have added decisive weight, which might have made Borodino a clear French victory; in any case, this was a road not taken by the Emperor. Russian counterattacks suggested that they were not as weak as Napoleon’s Generals insisted, even though these counterattacks were unsuccessful. By 3 pm, the so-called ‘Great Redoubt’ had finally fallen, and the Russians had withdrawn to a further defensive line, which faced repeated attacks until 10 pm. Napoleon’s strategy was simple but ultimately effective, winning him a limited victory; the death toll was massive for both sides, with 30,000 dead on the French side and in the region of 45,000 among the Russians. Though the French Emperor in 1812 was at the height of his military and political power, he was not at the peak of his abilities on the field; this, combined with the doggedness of Russian soldiers, saved Kutuzov from a much worse defeat. Kutuzov, in contrast to Napoleon, spent most of the day away from the action, giving his approval and disagreement to suggestions by his subordinates. Many contemporaries were critical of his inaction and seemingly fatalistic attitude to the battle's outcome. However, Kutuzov had many experienced field commanders who he could trust to make tactical decisions without immediate oversight. Recent histories have emphasised Kutuzov’s cunning but argued that he excelled at the political aspects of war rather than as a commander on the field.

The real outcome of the battle was not fully realised until later as the strategic situation changed. Though his generals were divided over the issue, Kutuzov chose not to fight a second battle in front of Moscow, which enabled the invaders to occupy it. The Russian commander, however, did not withdraw far and encouraged Napoleon in his belief that a negotiated settlement might be possible. Napoleon was sure that taking Moscow would be enough to bring Tsar Alexander to the negotiating table, but he was mistaken. His assumption was rooted in the military traditions of the time and experience; it was reasonable for him to assume an agreement might be reached. However, Kutuzov’s strategy was to keep Napoleon in the city as long as possible. The repercussions of the French Emperor's failure to secure a more convincing victory at Borodino were now felt as the options looked increasingly limited and Russian resolve increased. St Petersburg was 400 miles away, and it would be the depths of the winter before the French could reach it. The alternative, staying in Moscow, would mean the Tsarist armies would move in behind, cutting him off from his supply lines. The French army aimed to withdraw to Smolensk, where they would be closer to the border, but this move began the disastrous retreat which would define Napoleon’s 1812 campaign. Constantly harassed by Russian troops, the retreating French armies limped back to Poland through the winter snow. In hindsight, the French Emperor’s failure to commit his Imperial Guard or explore flanking moves at Borodino took on much greater significance. If either of these had met with success, it may have brought the Tsar to the negotiating table, reshaping European history to come. Successive Russian governments seized on the battle as a key moment for national mythmaking. Tsar Nicolas II, for example, consciously replicated Alexander I’s visit to Moscow in July 1812, over a hundred years later. On the eve of the First World War, a sacred union of Tsar and people was declared in front of the Virgin of Kazan, before which Kutuzov had prayed in 1812. During the Second World War, a Soviet offensive was named ‘Operation Bagration’ after one of Kutuzov’s commanders. By far the most influential contribution to the mythos of Borodino was Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace, which, more than any history of the conflict, helped to create a specifically Russian narrative around 1812. This narrative was largely divorced from the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, which saw Russia, Austria and Prussia secure Napoleon's final defeat, at least until his one hundred days return in 1815. However, Russian strategy stretched all the way to the occupation of Paris in 1814 and 1812 should not be ‘ghettoised’ into a single component of the Napoleonic Wars. Tolstoy’s interpretation, especially based on the lionisation of Kutuzov and a few others, was repeated without question for most of the Soviet period, which belied the contributions of the many non-Russians in the Tsarist military leadership, such as the Baltic German General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly. It has only been since the collapse of the Soviet Union that greater archival access has paved the way toward a greater appreciation for Russia’s contribution to defeating the Napoleonic regime.